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Duress: A Perplexing Barrier to Relief
from Joint and Several Liability
M. MEGHAN KERNS*
INTRODUCTION
The majority of married taxpayers do not fully appreciate the legal
ramifications of executing a joint tax return. Regardless of the actual
division of combined income, upon filing a joint return, each spouse is
responsible for the accuracy of the entire return and liable for the full
amount of any tax deficiency arising from the return.' To avoid joint and
several liability, a couple could file separate returns; however, this often
results in a greater total tax liability. Alternatively, a spouse who
qualifies as "innocent" of the erroneous items reported by his or her
spouse may claim relief under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6015.'
While relief from joint and several liability under I.R.C. § 6oi5 is an
improvement on its predecessor, former § 6oi3(e), problems still remain
that prevent many deserving taxpayers from obtaining relief. This Note
focuses on two situations in which the requesting spouse had actual
knowledge of the inaccuracy of the joint return, but signed the return
anyway. The spouse in the first situation signed the return under duress.
The spouse in the second situation signed the return to prevent
retaliatory spousal abuse. Under current Treasury Regulations, § 6oi5
relief is only available to those who sign out of fear of retaliation by an
abusive spouse. A spouse who signs under actual duress is required to
suffer the tax consequences of a married-filing-separately return (a
potentially debilitating outcome in community property states). This
distinction between abuse and duress is an affront to common sense and
in direct contradiction with both the text of the statute and the legislative
intent.
This Note argues that Congress intended § 6oi5 relief to be fully
* J.D. Candidate, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2007. A special thanks to Professor Daniel
J. Lathrope, Karen Hawkins, and Tom Albright for their thoughtful guidance; to Daniel P. Lake for
his encouragement and support; and to Jenni Khuu, Gavin Charlston, Sharif Jacob, and the entire
second-year staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work.
i. I.R.C. § 6oi3(a) (20oo) (permitting the filing of joint returns).
2. Id. § 6o15.
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available to spouses who sign joint returns under duress and that the
regulations should be amended accordingly or withdrawn. Part I of this
Note presents a brief history of the joint return and its accompanying
joint and several liability. Part II continues with a synopsis of the
operation and shortcomings of the previous innocent spouse relief
provision, I.R.C. § 6oI3(e), and an overview of the current relief from
joint and several liability available under I.R.C. § 6oi5. After examining
the somewhat analogous relief provided for taxpayers in community
property states under I.R.C. § 66(c), Part II concludes with a brief
discussion of Tax Court jurisdiction to review Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) denials of relief under the above provisions. Part III focuses on the
effect given by the Treasury Regulations to a finding of duress in the
signing of a joint return, and the resulting inconsistency between these
regulations and the legislative intent behind the statutory language.
Finally, Part IV recommends that the IRS either withdraw the current
regulations or amend them to produce a result that is in harmony with
the spirit of the Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.
I. THE JOINT RETURN
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JOINT RETURN
The option to file a joint return has been available to married
couples since 1918.' Whether or not spouses chose to file jointly or
separately was primarily based on convenience4 because, aside from the
requirement to share the personal deduction for married couples,
husbands and wives were generally treated as separate individuals by the
Internal Revenue Service.5 Early on, married taxpayers tried to take
advantage of the progressive rate system by assigning the income of the
spouse with higher earnings to the spouse with little or no earnings,
thereby decreasing the amount of income taxed at higher rate brackets.'
In 1930, the Supreme Court put an end to such income-splitting
efforts in Lucas v. Earl, holding that tax burdens can "not be escaped by
anticipatory arrangements and contracts however [skillfully] devised to
prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
[person] who earned it."7 However, later that year, in Poe v. Seaborn, the
3. See Karen Brown, Innocent Spouse Relief, in 645 TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO, at A-I (BNA,
No. 645, 2004); see also I.R.C. § 6o13(a).
4. Brown, supra note 3, at A-I.
5. See Ann F. Thomas, Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A
Primer and Legislative Scorecard, I6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. I, 43-44 (i999). Married couples could
voluntarily aggregate their incomes; however, to do so would generally result in greater total tax
liability due to the progressive tax rate schedule. Id.
6. LAURIE L. MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 588-89 (2002).
7. 281 U.S. III, II5 (930).
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Court held that income splitting was mandatory in community property
states! In Seaborn, the Court held that in community property states
each spouse is liable for the federal income tax due on one-half of the
couple's earnings, regardless of the actual division of income.' The
Seaborn holding put intense political pressure on common law state
legislatures to implement community property laws so that their married
residents could "enjoy" the tax benefits of income-splitting.'" By the
1940s, sharply progressive federal tax rates added to this pressure" and
common law states turned to Congress for a solution that would, without
affecting other property rights, put common law couples on equal footing
with their peers in community property states with regard to the federal
income tax.'"
Congress responded with the Revenue Act of 1948; which provided
that married couples in separate property states could file joint returns
with an income-splitting election.'3 In operation, separate property state
spouses achieved equality with community property spouses by splitting
their combined taxable income in half, computing the tax owed on the
marginal rate applicable to that figure, and then multiplying the tax owed
by two to determine their total tax liability.' 4 This legislation also had the
unintended effect of achieving "couples neutrality" in that all married
couples with equal aggregate incomes paid the same amount of federal
income tax, regardless of the division of income between the spouses.'5 In
addition, the 1948 Act created a "marriage bonus" when taxpayers that
were either the sole or primary earners in their households filed a joint
return with their spouses.
Unfortunately, the marriage bonus achieved by the Revenue Act of
1948 was concomitant with a tax penalty for unmarried taxpayers."
Assuming equal incomes, unmarried taxpayers paid more tax because
8. 282 U.S. IOI, Ig (193o).
9. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 589; see Seaborn, 282 U.S. at I17-I8 ("[T]he constitutional
requirement of uniformity is not intrinsic, but geographic. And differences of state law, which may
bring a person within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read into
the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of uniformity." (citations omitted)).
1O. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 589; Thomas, supra note 5, at 45.
I1. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 589.
12. Thomas, supra note 5, at 45-46.
13. Id. at 47-48; Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (2oo0).
14. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 301-05, 62 Stat. ItO, 114-16 (0948); Frederick J.
Bradshaw, IV, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Marriage Penalty: New Proposals in Light of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 54 TAX LAW. 701, 704 (2ooi); Brown,
supra note 3, at A-i; Angela V. Langlotz, Tying the Knot: The Tax Consequences of Marriage, 54 TAX
LAW. 329, 332 (2001); Thomas, supra note 5, at 47-48.
15. Zelenak, supra note 13, at 4 (emphasizing that this legislation was the result of political
pressure in the guise of tax policy).
16. Id.; see also Bradshaw, supra note 14, at 703.
17. Langlotz, supra note L4, at 332.
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the rate schedules for married couples filing joint returns were precisely
double what they were for unmarried filers.' Congress dealt with this
issue in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 by introducing lower rate schedules
for unmarried taxpayers, which effectively reduced the tax brackets for
joint returns to less than double the brackets for unmarried taxpayers.'9
However, this change led to another unintended effect: the marriage
penalty.
2
The marriage penalty is most prominent in dual-income couples with
incomes that are relatively equal because their tax liability is greater than
it would be had they filed separate returns as unmarried taxpayers.'
These couples cannot avoid the marriage penalty by filing separately
because the 1969 amendments established a new and unfavorable rate
schedule for married taxpayers filing separate returns." Thus, the 1969
married-filing-separately rate schedule effectively thwarted attempts to
revive the community property debate. 3
Today, some dual-income couples can achieve tax savings by filing
separate returns if they have relatively equal incomes. However, whether
they do so largely depends on the credits and deductions available to
each individual.24 Some deductions use a percentage of adjusted gross
income (AGI) as a threshold requirement that specified expenses must
surpass in order to be deducted. For example, miscellaneous itemized
deductions may only be deducted to the extent they exceed 2% of AGI.25
Dual-income couples reduce their individual threshold requirements for
I8. Id.
i9. I.R.C. § i(c) (2ooo); Tax Reform Act of 8969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 679 (1969);
MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 589-9o; Langlotz, supra note 14, at 332 (citing EDWARD L.
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 63-64 (1997)). Note that this is the result of incompatible tax policies.
Professor Lawrence Zelenak offers the following summary of this phenomenon:
As a matter of arithmetic, it is simply impossible to have a tax system that simultaneously
possesses (i) progressive marginal rates, (2) couples neutrality, and (3) marriage neutrality
(that is, no marriage bonuses or penalties). A truly flat tax (with no exemption amount or
zero bracket) can achieve couples neutrality and marriage neutrality at the sacrifice of
progressivity. A separate return system can have progressive rates and marriage neutrality,
at the sacrifice of couples neutrality. But if progressive marginal rates and couples neutrality
are required, there must be marriage penalties, marriage bonuses, or both.
Zelenak, supra note 13, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
20. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 59o. Note that there are only two options: either marriage
neutrality or a bonus and penalty. That is, where there is a marriage penalty, there is a bonus to single
taxpayers, and where there is a marriage bonus, there is a penalty on single taxpayers. For a discussion
of the concept, see id.; Zelenak, supra note 13, at 6. For a general overview of the marriage penalty,
see generally Langlotz, supra note 14.
21. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 59O; Thomas, supra note 5, at 52-53. It is still possible to
obtain the marriage bonus, generally where incomes are disproportionate. The exact numbers, as well
as the bonus or penalty, are a necessary part of the rate structure in I.R.C. § i.
22. 83 Stat. at 681-82; Thomas, supra note 5, at 53.
23. Thomas, supra note 5, at 53.
24. ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
231 (5th ed. 2002).
25. I.R.C. § 67(a).
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such deductions by filing separately.26
Even so, filing joint returns often produces the least tax liability for
married couples. In addition to combining income, couples filing joint
returns combine credits, deductions, and exemptions.27 Furthermore,
some credits are only available to joint filers, including the Hope and
Lifetime Learning credits,s the elderly or permanently and totally
disabled credit, 9 the adoption expense credit," the child and dependent
care credit,3' and the earned income credit." The same is true for a
number of deductions; for example, the ability to deduct a qualified
education loan is not available to married-filing-separately taxpayers.33
In contrast to the deductions described in the previous paragraph,
some deductions are restricted to a percentage of AGI and thus reward
dual-income joint-filers for having a combined AGI.34 Finally, for couples
subject to the alternative minimum tax, filing jointly allows married
couples to shield more "preference income" from taxation than they
would be able to as separate filers.35
However, there remain disadvantages to filing a joint return. For
example, the IRS may redirect to other government agencies refunds
from joint returns to fulfill certain debts owed by one spouse, such as
overdue child support or student loans 6.3 Most significantly, spouses filing
joint returns are jointly and severally liable for the total tax owed by the
couple.37
B. DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Although the tax benefit of filing a joint return did not exist until
1948, married couples filing joint returns have been subject to joint and
26. Note that if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other must do so too. The American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, 36o Degrees of Financial Literacy:
Choosing an Income Tax Filing Status, http://www.36ofinancialliteracy.org/Life+Stages/Career/
Articles/Taxes/Choosing+an+income+tax+filing+status.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) [hereinafter
American Institute of CPAs].
27. Id.
28. I.R.C. § 25A(g)(6) (2ooo).
29. Id. § 22(e)(I).
30. Id. § 23(0(0.
31. Id. § 129(b)(t)(B).
32. Id. § 32(d); CCH, 2006 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE 128 (2005); American Institute of CPAs,
supra note 26.
33. I.R.C. § 25A; CCH, supra note 32, at 128; American Institute of CPAs, supra note 26.
34. For example, I.R.C. § 68(a)(i) states that the amount of the itemized deductions otherwise
allowable in a taxable year may not be taken in excess of 3% of AGI. I.R.C. § 68(a)(i).
35. I.R.C. § 55; CCH, supra note 32, at 127 (explaining that joint filers have both a larger
exemption amount and a greater phase-out of exemption amount than their married-filing-separately
counterparts).
36. American Institute of CPAs, supra note 26.
37. I.R.C. § 6o3(a).
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several liability for the total of any income tax deficiency since 1918.38
One explanation for this is that joint and several liability is perceived by
some to be a necessary evil, aimed at thwarting "the manipulation that
might occur [in its absence if the spouse who] is liable for income taxes
transferred assets to the other in order to avoid collection."39 Another
common justification is that joint and several liability is the cost
associated with the tax benefits married couples receive from filing a
joint return.4' However, as discussed above, this could not be the
legislative purpose behind joint and several liability for two reasons: (I)
the cost predates the marriage bonus,4 and (2) the joint return itself
sometimes results in a penalty.42
Nevertheless, in the event of a deficiency, the IRS may collect the
full amount owed by either spouse.43 If one spouse cannot be located or
does not have an attachable income stream, the IRS will pursue the other
spouse who is then responsible for the full deficiency as well as any
penalties.' This is true even if the spouses are later divorced.45 After
making full payment, the paying-spouse may attempt to recover the
deficiency amount not allocable to her by claiming her contribution
rights against the other spouse." Since there is little information with
regard to the frequency of or the effectiveness of such pursuits,
enforcement of contribution rights is said to be rare.47 In any event, the
potential for inequitable results is immense with the strict enforcement of
joint and several liability4"
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
A. INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF PRIOR TO 1998: § 6OI3(E)
In 1971, Congress responded to the problem of strict enforcement of
joint and several liability with a new provision, formerly codified at
38. I.R.C. § 6o3(d)(3); Brown, supra note 3, at I.
39. Brown, supra note 3, at I.
40. Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws Governing Joint and Several
Tax Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261, 274 (2OO4).
41. See supra Part I.A.
42. Kahng, supra note 40, at 274. This article also provides an in-depth analysis of an array of
principles that might be said to support joint and several liability and how each rationale fails in the
joint return context.
43. I.R.C. § 6oi3(d)(3).
44- Id.; see Martha W. Jordan, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Defining a Proportionate Solution,
24 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 517,521 (1998); Kahng, supra note 40, at 264.
45. Melvyn B. Frumkes, The Federalization of Family Law: Article Effect of TRA 1997 and
RARA 1998 on Divorce Taxation, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 121, 138 (1999).
46. Kahng, supra note 40, at 263-64.
47. See id. at 264.
48. See S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (i7o) (referring to a case in which a wife was held liable for an
understatement of tax liability resulting from her husband's unreported embezzled funds).
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26 U.S.C. § 6013(e), and commonly known as "innocent spouse relief."49
Section 6013(e) relieved "innocent" spouses from the tax liability
incurred as a result of their spouses' fraudulent reporting." Innocent
spouses include those who did not significantly benefit from or have
knowledge of underreported income or improper deductions or credits.'
This exception to joint and several liability sought "to bring government
tax collection practices into accord with basic principles of equity and
fairness."52 In operation, however, § 6013(e) relief proved quite difficult
to obtain.
To qualify for relief under former § 6013(e), the requesting spouse
needed to meet each of the following requirements: (I) the spouses filed
a joint return for the taxable year in question; (2) the return showed a
"substantial" understatement53 of tax liability and this understatement
was the result of "grossly erroneous items"" of the other spouse;"5 (3) the
innocent spouse, in signing the return, did not know (and had no reason
to know) of the above understatement;,6 and (4) considering all facts and
circumstances, holding the innocent spouse liable for the tax deficiency
would be inequitable. 7
A "substantial understatement" of tax liability was one that was
greater than $500.8 If the deficiency was linked to an inappropriate
credit, deduction, or basis in property, the amount also had to surpass a
certain percentage of the innocent spouse's AGI for the year prior to the
one in which the notice of deficiency was mailed." This test was
presumably more difficult for taxpayers at lower incomes to meet.
60
49. I.R.C. § 6o13(e) (1994), repealed by Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-2o6, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). The scope of innocent spouse relief has been broadened
twice. This section covers the provisions as amended in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 8O-O3. For a discussion of the original provisions, see Brown, supra note 3, at A-
35. The current innocent spouse relief provisions are discussed infra Part II.C.2. While "innocent
spouse relief" is the common term, "relief from joint and several liability" is becoming a more popular
label because this relief, in its current form, is not just for the "innocent." See generally KAREN L.
HAWKINS, THE INNOCENT AND THE NOT-SO-INNOCENT: THE EVOLUTION OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
RELIEF 4-5 (2oo6).
5O. Svetlana G. Attestatova, Note, The Bonds of Joint Tax Liability Should Not Be Stronger Than
Marriage: Congressional Intent Behind § 6oi5(c) Separation of Liability Relief, 78 WASH. L. REV. 83 1,
832 (2003).
51. See I.R.C. § 6oi3(e)(I).
52. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, at 2 (1970).
53- Id. § 6o13(e)(i)(B).
54- Id. § 6oi3(e)(I)(C).
55- Id. § 6ot3(e)(1)(D).
56. Id. § 6013(e)(I)(C).
57. Id. § 6o13(e)(I)(D).
58. Id. § 6oi3(e)(3).
59- Id. § 6oi3(e)(4). This income test was set at io% for individuals with AGIs at or below
$2o,ooo and 25% for all others. Id.; see Frumkes, supra note 45, at 139.
60. John B. Harper, Federal Tax Relief for Innocent Spouses: New Opportunities Under the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 998, 6I ALA. LAW. 204, 204 (2000).
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While any item of unreported income qualified as "grossly
erroneous," claims for deductions, credits, and bases in property had to
have "no basis in fact or law" in order to qualify. 6' This latter standard
was quite an obstacle for taxpayers to overcome because the fact that a
deduction, credit or basis was disallowed was not always enough to show
that there was no basis in fact or law.t3 Ironically, the IRS. would often
argue that a taxpayer's claim for a deduction, credit or basis did have a
basis in fact or law even though the tax deficiency arose from the IRS's
disallowance of the claim.64
With respect to the knowledge requirement, courts were inconsistent
in their treatment. 6' The majority of cases held that relief would not be
granted to a spouse who knew all of the facts of a transaction connected
to the understatement. 66 However, other courts also considered the
education and business expertise of the spouse seeking relief.6" In the
case of a deficiency arising from an erroneous deduction, some courts
held that knowledge of the deduction alone would bar relief. Although
§ 6013(e) did not provide for partial relief, some courts would grant
partial relief when an innocent spouse met the knowledge requirement
for some erroneous items, but not others.
69
Courts were similarly unpredictable in determining when the denial
of relief was inequitable. Whether the spouse seeking relief benefited
significantly from the understatement was a very important factor.70 In
addition, consideration was given to whether the couple was divorced or
separated and whether the spouse asking for relief had been deserted by
the other spouse.7'
As may be evident at this point, § 6o13(e) was unable to live up to its
intended purpose. Rarely could any taxpayer meet the stringent
requirements.72 Perhaps the reason for this was that "the prior provisions
61. I.R.C. § 6oi3(e)(2).
62. Craig D. Bell, Need-to-Know Divorce Tax Law for Legal Assistant Officers, 177 MIL. L. REV.
213, 325 (2003); see id. at 325 n.580 (citing cases).
63. Harper, supra note 6o, at 204.
64. Scott Kauffman, The New (Less) Innocent Spousal Relief, 42 ORANGE CouNTY LAW. 32, 32
(2000).
65. Harper, supra note 6o, at 204; Kauffman, supra note 64, at 32. For a concise discussion of this
knowledge requirement, see Kahng, supra note 40, at 265-66 & nn.20-23.
66. See Brown, supra note 3, at 32 (citing Reser v. Comm'r, 112 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1997));
Kauffman, supra note 64, at 32 (citing R.D. Bokum v. Comm'r, 992 F.2d 1132 (I ith Cir. 1993)).
67. Kauffman, supra note 64, at 32 (citing P.A. Price v. Comm'r, 887 F.2d. 959 (9th Cir. 1989)).
68. See Brown, supra note 3, at 23 (citing Park v. Comm'r, 25 F.3 d 1289 (5th Cir. 1994)).
69. See Kahng, supra note 40, at 265-66; Kauffman, supra note 64, at 32.
70. Kahng, supra note 40, at 266 & n.24 (citing cases).
71. See id. at 267 (citing Estate of Krock v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 672,677-79 (1989) as an example).
72. Kauffman, supra note 64, at 33 ("Relief under the prior innocent spousal provisions was, in
fact, so infrequently granted that it was, in the words of the Senate Finance Committee, merely
theoretical."); Robert S. Steinberg, Three at Bats Against Joint and Several Liability: (i) Innocent
[Vol. 58" 1123
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for innocent spousal relief were themselves a contradiction in terms: If
there was a substantial understatement of tax attributable to a grossly
erroneous item, should not the spouse seeking relief have had reason to
know of the understatement? '73 Another commentator criticized the
statute for the subjective nature of the knowledge and equity
requirements, noting that "a review of the cases makes it clear that the
determinative issue was whether the spouse seeking relief under these
provisions can move the judge to sympathy."74 The concern surrounding
the inadequacy of § 6o13(e) did not escal5e Congress' attention. In the
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Congress repealed § 6o3(e) and
replaced it with a new regimen for innocent spouse relief in § 6o1. 75
B. THE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998: § 6oI5
The Restructuring and Reform Act of 199876 made a number of
important changes to the innocent spouse rules. First, the 1998 Act
broadened the availability of traditional relief under former § 6oi3(e).
Second, recognizing that many requesting spouses fall short of satisfying
every requirement necessary to obtain traditional relief, the 1998 Act
provided two additional options for obtaining relief: the separate liability
election and equitable relief. Congress' principal objective was to make
relief more accessible.7
i. Traditional Relief
Traditional innocent spouse relief, codified as I.R.C. § 6015(b), is a
broader version of the relief available under prior law. Taxpayers who
satisfy every requirement under this section are relieved of joint and
several liability for the tax, interest, and penalties arising from the
erroneous item that caused the understatement.78 The 1998 Act
expanded the availability of this traditional relief by removing the words
"substantial" from the understatement requirement and "grossly" from
the erroneous item requirement.79 The joint return, knowledge, and
Spouse (2) The Election to Limit Liability and (3) Equitable Relief.- The Treasury and Courts Begin to
Interpret IRC 6oi 5 After Enactment of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 403, 403-04 (2001).
73. Kauffman, supra note 64, at 33.
74. C. Ian McLachlan, Spousal Mobility and Federal Income Taxes, 1o J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 65, 72 (1993).
75. Pub. L. No. I05-2o6, 2301, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified at I.R.C. § 6oI5 (200o)); MICHAEL I.
SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE I 7B.Io[I] (2d ed. 2002).
76. 112 Stat. at 734.
77. STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN 1998, at 67 (Comm. Print i998) [hereinafter 1998 BLUE BOOK], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/congress/joint/hjointolcp1o5.html ("Congress was concerned that the innocent
spouse provisions of prior law were inadequate. The Congress believed it was inappropriate to limit
innocent spouse relief only to the most egregious cases .....
78. I.R.C. § 6oI5(b)(i) (2000).
79. See id. § 6oI5(b)(x)(B); Bell, supra note 62, at 326; Kahng, supra note 40, at 267.
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equity requirements remain essentially unchanged."' In addition, if a
spouse meets the knowledge requirement for some, but not all, of the
understatement, he may obtain partial relief for the portion that he did
not know or have reason to know about.8' Finally, there is a two-year
statute of limitations imposed for seeking relief, starting when the IRS
commences collection activities.z
2. Separate Liability Election
Section 6o15(c) provides a new form of relief and is based on the
proportional "innocence" of the spouse requesting relief. This separate
liability election is only available to a spouse who is divorced, separated,
or has lived apart from the other spouse for the twelve-month period
prior to the election for relief.8 Under § 6oI5(c), a spouse may elect to
limit his liability to that portion of the tax deficiency allocable to him,
although he may not escape liability for portions of the deficiency
allocable to the other spouse of which he had actual knowledge when
signing the return.84 A principle benefit of the separation of liability
election is that a spouse who had "reason to know" but not "actual
knowledge" of an erroneous item is not barred from relief.85 Notably, the
bar on actual knowledge of an item giving rise to a deficiency does not
apply if the return was signed under duress.6 However, relief is not
available if either spouse acted fraudulently or if assets were transferred
between spouses with the primary purpose of tax avoidance. 8' The same
statute of limitations articulated under § 6oI5(b) also applies to a
separate liability election under § 6oI5(c). 88
Section 6oI5(d) provides the rules for the allocation of liability that
accompanies a § 6oi5(c) election. Generally, the requesting spouse's
liability is limited to that portion of the tax liability generated from items
that would have been allocated to the requesting spouse had the
requesting spouse originally chosen to file a separate return for the tax
year in question!' However, when the filing of a separate return would
result in the disallowance of a deduction or credit, the deduction or
8o. See id. § 6oI 5 (b)(I)(C)-(D).
81. Id. § 6o15(b)(2).
82. Id. § 6ot 5 (b)(I)(E).
83. Id. § 6ot 5 (c)(3)(A)(i).
84. Id. § 6o15(c)(3)(C). Note that whether the spouse had a reason to know of the
understatement is immaterial under this subsection. "Actual knowledge" was defined in Cheshire v.
Commissioner as "actual and clear awareness ... of the existence of an item which gives rise to the
deficiency (or portion thereof)." 115 T.C. 183, 195 (2000).
85. Treas. Reg. § i.6oi5-3(c)(2) (2oo4).
86. Id.
87. I.R.C. § 6o5(c)(3)(A)(ii).
88. Id. § 6ox5(c)(3)(B).
89. Id. § 6oI 5 (d)(3)(A).
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credit is calculated as if there was no such prohibition.9 If the deduction
or credit is the source of the deficiency, then the deficiency is allocated to
the spouse to whom the deduction or credit is allocated.9' There is an
exception to this rule when one spouse benefits from the other's
deduction. In that case, the deficiency is allocated to the spouse who
received the benefit in an amount equal to the tax benefit. 2 Community
property laws are generally disregarded for purposes of this section.93
3. Equitable Relief
Section 6oI5(f) grants equitable relief and is a last resort for spouses
who are unable to meet the requirements of either § 6015(b) or (c).94 In
this situation, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determines
whether holding a spouse liable for all or a portion of the deficiency
would be inequitable in light of all facts and circumstances.95 Congress
intended this provision to provide relief in situations where a joint return
reported the correct amount of tax owed (and therefore there was not an
understatement), but that amount was not paid in full and the innocent
spouse was not aware of the underpayment. 6 Congress also noted that
equitable relief may be available in other situations.' The IRS has
provided guidelines for determining when equitable relief should be
granted in Revenue Procedure 2003-61 .9
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 first sets forth an extensive list of
threshold requirements.' If the requirements are satisfied, the IRS
9o. Id. § 6oi5(d)(4); i998 BLUE BOOK, supra note 77, at 68.
91. I.R.C. § 6oI5(d)(3)(A); Harper, supra note 60, at 205; Kauffman, supra note 64, at 35.
92. I.R.C. § 6oI5(d)(3)(B).
93. Treas. Reg. § i.6o15-1(f) (2004). The significance of disregarding community property laws is
explained infra Part II.C.
94. I.R.C. § 6oi5(0(2).
95. Id. § 6OI5(f)(I).
96. See Kahng, supra note 40, at 269-70 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254 (I998).
97. See id. at 270 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254-55); see also HAWKINS, supra note 49, at
4-5.
98. Rev. Proc. 2003-6I, 2003-2 C.B. 296.
99. These requirements mandate that the innocent spouse: (i) filed a joint return for the taxable
year in question; (2) be unable to obtain relief via § 6o15(b) or (c); (3) meet the two-year statute of
limitations beginning on the date of the IRS's first collection activity; (4) not have engaged in a
fraudulent transfer of assets with the other spouse; (5) not have received disqualified assets from the
other spouse; (6) not have fraudulent intent with regard to filing or failing to file the return in
question; and (7) request relief only with regard to tax liability arising from items attributable to the
other spouse. Id. § 4.01. The final threshold requirement, (7), does not apply in the following
situations: (a) the attribution to the innocent spouse is solely due to community property law; (b)
nominal ownership (when an innocent spouse can rebut the presumption that an item titled in the
name of the innocent spouse is attributable to that spouse); (c) the innocent spouse did not know (or
have reason to know) that funds that were meant for the payment of tax were misappropriated by the
other spouse for the other spouse's benefit; and (d) the innocent spouse suffered abuse (not
amounting to duress) such that fear of retaliation from the other spouse prevented the innocent
spouse from challenging the correctness of the return. Id.
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provides a safe-harbor for the situations involving underpayments'" (as
envisioned by Congress) as well as a list of non-exclusive factors, which
are relevant in all other situations. These factors are: marital status,
economic hardship, knowledge or reason to know, non-requesting
spouse's legal obligation, significant benefit, compliance with income tax
laws, abuse, and mental or physical health."'
C. RELIEF FOR SPOUSES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES: § 66
Innocent spouses who file joint returns in community property
states' 2 are eligible for innocent spouse relief under § 6oi5.'° As noted
above, this provides relief from items that, while attributable to
community income in a community property state, would otherwise be
attributable to the other spouse. Section 6oi5 does not necessarily
prevent an innocent spouse from being taxed on income from the
innocent spouse's half of community property.' 4
For spouses filing separate returns in community property states,
there is still the possibility that an innocent spouse will be unfairly
burdened by the tax liability of his or her spouse. This is because spouses
in community property states are considered to "own" half of the income
earned by their spouses and are thus taxed on that amount even when
they file separate returns.'"5 Thus, an innocent spouse filing a separate
return could be held liable for half of the underreported income of the
other spouse, even if the innocent spouse did not know of the amount or
existence of this income."'6
Innocent spouse relief in this context is governed by § 66. Section
66(a) provides relief by reallocating the spouses' income under § 879(a)
if the following four requirements are met: (i) the spouses lived apart for
the entire year in question and were married at any time during that
year, (2) the spouses did not file a joint return for the year in question,
(3) at least one of the spouses earned community income, and (4) no
transfer of that community income occurred between the spouses.7
Under § 897(a), three types of community income will be reclassified:
I0. Id. § 4.02.
Ioi. Id. § 4.03.
102. The community property states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
103. I.R.C. § 6o15(a) (2000) ("Any determination under this section shall be made without regard
to community property laws.").
104. Kaye A. Thomas, Relief from Spousal Liability: Community Property States (2002),
http://www.fairmark.comlspousal/comprop.htm.
105. GUNN & WARD, supra note 24, at 231-32; see also Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 1Oi, 118 (193o)
(holding that each spouse is required to report one-half of all community income on their separate
returns).
io6. GUNN & WARD, supra note 24, at 232; Thomas, supra note 104.
io7. I.R.C. § 66(a).
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earned income; business, trade or partnership income; and income
derived from separate property.""' Earned income is allocated to the
earning spouse."'° Income from a trade or business or a partner's share of
partnership income is allocated to the spouse who maintains substantial
control over the trade or business or the spouse who is a partner.'' °
Finally, income derived from separate property is allocated to the spouse
who owns the separate property."' The treatment of whatever
community income falls outside of these three categories is governed by
community property law."2 Thus the combined operation of § 66(a) and
§ 879(a) does not provide complete relief. In addition, the requirements
of 66(a) can be a tough hurdle for some taxpayers to overcome. " '
Fortunately, § 66 offers two additional methods for obtaining relief
from the community income problem. Under § 66(b), the IRS is
permitted to ignore community property law in determining tax liability
when a taxpayer treats community income as though he is "solely
entitled to such income and fail[s] to notify... [his] spouse.., of the
nature and amount of such income" prior to the deadline for filing a
return."4 However, it is important to note that the IRS is not required to
disregard community property law in this context. The language of the
I.R.C. merely states that the IRS "may" choose to do so."5
Section 66(c) offers equitable relief in cases where an innocent
spouse: (i) did not file a joint return; (2) did not include any item of
community income which, per the rules described above under § 879(a),
would be attributable to the other spouse; (3) did not know or have
reason to know of such item of community income; and (4) including that
item of community income in the innocent spouse's taxable income
would be inequitable, considering all facts and circumstances."6 When
these requirements are met, the item of community income will be
allocated to the other spouse and the innocent spouse will not be taxed
on that item."7 The last sentence under § 66(c) takes equitable relief one
step further, providing that the IRS may relieve an innocent spouse of
any or all of the tax deficiency if it would be inequitable to hold the
spouse liable." 8 Section 66(c) is comparable to § 6OI5(f) and its operation
io8. Id. § 879(a).
lO9. Id. §§ 879(a)(I), 91 i(d)(2) (defining earned income).
iio. Id. §§ 879(a)(2), 1402(a)(5).
Ii. Id. § 879(a)(3).
112. Id. § 879(a)(4).
113. Adrianne Hodgkins, Getting a Second Chance: The Need for Tax Court Jurisdiction Over IRS
Denials of Relief Under Section 66,65 LA. L. REv. 1167, 1173 (2005).
114. I.R.C. § 66(b).
I15. Id.
1i6. Id. § 66(c).
117. Id.
II8. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
is also governed by Revenue Procedure 2003-6I (as described supra Part
II.B , but with the first two threshold requirements excepted)."9
D. REVIEW OF CLAIM DENIALS: TAX COURT JURISDICTION
To obtain relief under § 6oI5 or § 66 the taxpayer must request relief
from the IRS by filing a Form 8857."2' The IRS must grant relief to all
qualifying taxpayers requesting relief under § 6oi5(b) or (c).' 2' However,
whether relief is granted under § 6oI5(f) or § 66(c) is at the discretion of
the IRS.'22 In the event that a claim for relief is denied, the United States
Tax Court's jurisdiction to review that denial is often dependant on what
type of relief the taxpayer has been denied.' 3
The extent of the Tax Court's jurisdiction is dictated by Congress
through statutory grants.' 4 Section 6213(a) grants the Tax Court
jurisdiction to review a § 6o15 claim when it is raised as an affirmative
defense in a deficiency or collection proceeding for the year at issue.' 5
Additionally, § 6oi5(e) explicitly provides the Tax Court jurisdiction
where a taxpayer "against whom a deficiency has been asserted" has
elected relief under § 6oi5(b) or (c) and the IRS has denied such relief. ,6
These statutes leave the Tax Court without jurisdiction over a denial of
relief in "stand alone" situations, when a taxpayer has elected relief
under § 6o15(f) and no deficiency is asserted.'27
With regard to jurisdiction to review denials of § 66 relief, the Tax
Court is much more restricted.2' Section 66 offers no jurisdictional grant
to the Tax Court'29 and the Court has concluded that it has no jurisdiction
to review denials of § 66 relief unless there is an independent ground for
jurisdiction.'3 ° The Tax Court's severely limited jurisdiction over § 66
claims leaves many taxpayers seeking relief under § 66(c) solely at the
mercy of the IRS. 3'
II9. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, §§ .OI, 4.01.
120. I.R.S. Form 8857.
121. I.R.C. § 6o15(b)-(c).
122. Id. §§ 66, 6oi5(f).
123. For a comprehensive evaluation of Tax Court jurisdiction over innocent spouse claims, see
generally Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006).
124. Hodgkins, supra note 113, at 1174 (noting that the Tax Court does not have the Article III
powers of the Constitution).
125. I.R.C. § 6213(a); Steinberg, supra note 72, at 41H.
126. I.R.C. § 6oi5(e).
127. Billings, 127 T.C. at 17 ("Congress's phrasing of [§ 6o15(e)()(A) is] a clear, though perhaps
inadvertent, deprivation of [the Tax Court's] jurisdiction over nondeficiency stand-alone petitions.").
128. Hodgkins, supra note 113, at 1177.
129. I.R.C. § 66.
130. See generally Bernal v. Comm'r, 12o T.C. 102 (2003); Whitacre v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op.
2003-21 (2003); Beck v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 347 (2001); Hodgkins, supra note 113, at 1177-78.
131. See generally Hodgkins, supra note 113.
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III. DURESS AND INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
A. DURESS AND THE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
Prior to the Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, a finding of
duress was typically used to circumvent § 6oi3(a) joint and several
liability by voiding the joint return and assessing tax liability as if
married-filing-separately returns were originally filed.'32 Alternatively,
abuse-not-amounting-to-duress was seen as a strong factor in favor of
providing equitable relief under former § 6oi3(e), and was often used to
overcome the "actual knowledge or reason to know" prohibition on such
relief. In the 1998 Act, however, Congress specifically included statutory
language providing that duress would override the actual knowledge
prohibition on § 6oi5(c) relief. '33 Since 1998, the IRS has strategically
amended its regulations on § 6oi3(a)'34 regarding joint returns, and has
issued final regulations on § 6o15,'35 regarding innocent spouse relief, to
ensure that a finding of duress in signing a joint return will result in the
taxpayer being treated as if she had filed a separate return, thereby
precluding any claim for relief under § 6oi5. Relief for innocent spouses
filing separate returns is only available in community property states
under § 66. Note that an innocent spouse suffering from abuse-not-
amounting-to-duress is still eligible to seek relief under subsections
6oi5(c) I, 6 and (f), as well as relief under 66(c).'37 However, as the
following analysis will show, the distinction between duress and abuse-
not-amounting-to-duress is virtually indistinguishable, and further, it is
inequitable and against Congressional intent to deny both remedies to
innocent spouses signing returns under duress.
i. Definitions of Duress and Abuse-Not-Amounting-to-Duress
The Internal Revenue Code does not provide a definition of duress
and the case law addressing duress does so only under the former
132. Note that calculating tax liability as if a married-filing-separately return had been filed still
leaves community property spouses in a perilous situation. Consider the following example. For the
taxable year at issue, Husband (H) had a taxable income of $13oooo and wife (W) had a taxable
income of $20,000. H only reported a total taxable income of $120,000 for the joint return. W knew
that H had understated his income, but signed the joint return under duress. The I.R.S. begins
deficiency proceeds for the $3o,o00 understatement of income. W and H live in a community property
state. If W establishes that she signed the return under duress, her tax liability is computed as if she
had originally filed a married-filing-separately return. However, the rule of Poe v. Seaborn dictates
that W must report half of her income and half of her husband's income on her separate return.
Therefore, W's taxable income is $75,ooo (= x $20,000 + x $13o,00o). If she lived in a separate
property state, she would be taxed only on the income she earned, which is $2o,ooo. See Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1930).
133. I.R.C. § 6os5(c)(3)(C).
134. Treas. Reg. § 1.6o3-4(d) (2002).
135. Id. § i.6015-3(c)(2)(v).
136. Id.
137. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, 99 4.0i(7)(d), 4.03(2)(a).
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§ 6oI3(e). So far, the Tax Court has found this case law adequate in
analyzing § 6oi5 cases. 38 The uniform standard adopted by the courts for
determining- the existence of duress in the signing of a joint return
contains the following essential elements: "(I) Whether the taxpayer was
unable to resist demands to sign the return; and (2) whether 'she would
not have signed the returns except for the constraint applied to her
will.'
1 39
For situations involving abuse-not-amounting-to-duress, "abuse" is
articulated in the Treasury Regulations as follows:
If the requesting spouse establishes that he or she was the victim of
domestic abuse prior to the time the return was signed, and that, as a
result of the prior abuse, the requesting spouse did not challenge the
treatment of any items on the return for fear of the nonrequesting
spouse's retaliation, the limitation on actual knowledge in this
paragraph (c) will not apply.4
This definition is used for the purpose of determining whether a taxpayer
falls under the abuse exception to the actual knowledge requirement of
§ 6oi5(c).'4 ' The same definition is also used in determining whether
equitable relief should be granted under both § 6oI5(f) and § 66(c).'42
2. Cases Involving Duress
In each of the following cases, the court held that the wife signed the
joint return(s) under duress. Note that most of these cases involve a
history of violence, abuse or threats of abuse at the time of signing the
return, and reluctance on the part of the innocent spouse in signing the
return. Another common element is a threat to separate the wife from
her children.
In Frederick v. Commissioner, the husband had been arrested three
138. See Frumkes, supra note 45, at 4 (citing Cheshire v. Comm'r, 1i5 T.C. 183 (2ooo); Charlton v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 333 (2000)). Federal courts have maintained that a uniform rule for duress should
be used in all cases and have therefore rejected the application of state law definitions of duress. See
id. (citing Stanley (Hazel) v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 555 (1966) ("We do not believe that Congress intended
the meaning of the term 'joint return' as used in section 6o13, to vary from State to State according to
the peculiarities of local rules about duress.")).
139. Brown v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 116, Ii9 (1968) (quoting Stanley (Hazel), 45 T.C. at 562). In
Furnish v. Comm'r, 262 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1958), quoted in Stanley (Hazel), the court elaborates
on the concept of duress in the joint return context, stating that: "the question is merely whether the
pressure applied did in fact so far affect the individual concerned as to deprive him of contractual
volition; if it did there is duress, if it did not there is none" and "'[d]uress' may exist not only when a
gun is held to one's head while a signature is being subscribed to a document. A long continued course
of mental intimidation can be equally as effective, and perhaps more so, in constituting duress." In
Stanley (Hazel), the court noted the subjective nature of the test in that the state of mind of the
individual is relevant, not "the means by which the given state of mind was induced . 45 T.C. at
561.
140. Treas. Reg. § i.6o15-3(C)(2)(V).
141. Id.
142. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, §§ 4.oi(7)(d), 4.03(2)(a).
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times for assaulting his wife and there was evidence of abuse on several
other occasions.143 When the wife objected to signing a blank tax return,
the husband grabbed her by the throat and, according to her testimony
said, "if I knowed when I was well off, I would sign." 1" She signed the
return out of fear of physical harm.'45
In Brown (Lola) v. Commissioner, the wife testified about her
relationship with her abusive husband, stating that he "would put me in
fear of my life if I didn't do what he said, as long as I did what he said, he
didn't threaten me.' ' 6 When she inquired about the accuracy of the tax
returns her husband merely said that a "C.P.A. fixed them" though he
refused to let her study them.'47 When she asked questions about the
return, he would become incensed and tell her to sign the return "or
else."'4 The wife further testified that "when I started questioning this,
things got worse. I suffered more and the children suffered more."'49
In Stanley (Diane) v. Commissioner, a wife submitted her W-2 form
to her husband after he threatened to take away her children.5° The
husband then filed a joint return by signing the wife's name without her
permission. The court noted one instance of abuse in which the husband
"forced [her] into their car, drove at a speed in excess of ioo miles per
hour and threatened to push [her] out of the car with his feet."''5' The
court also noted that the threat to separate a mother from her children
"can be even more important to a mother than her physical safety.'. 52
Pirnia v. Commissioner involved a marital history of both mental
and physical abuse. 3 Again, the threat used by the violent husband was
that he would take the children away if she did not sign the tax return."'
The husband in In re Hinckley had been a tax lawyer, but suffered a
head injury that led to the demise of his career and caused erratic and
often abusive behavior.'5 The wife became wary that in her husband's
143. 26 T.C.M. (P-H) 864, 865 (1957).
I44. Id.
145. Id.
146. 51 T.C. 116, 120 (1968).
147. Id. at 118.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 120.
i5o. 8I T.C. 634,636 (1983).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 638.
153. 59 T.C.M. (P-H) 2149, 2151 (1990).
154. ld. at 2151. This was no empty threat. A few years before the wife signed the returns in
question, the wife told the husband that she and the children were going to leave him. Later that night
the husband said that he was taking the children to the mall and did not return for nine months. Id. at
2150.
155. 256 B.R. 814 (2ooo). Note that this case takes place after the Restructuring and Reform Act
of i998 but before the IRS issued regulations. This case involves a finding of duress which, under
6oi5(c)(3)(C), enables the taxpayer to elect separate liability under § 6oI5(c).
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mental decline his theory on their tax liability was possibly incorrect. 16
However she signed the return to pacify her husband, fearful of what he
might do to himself or to her if she questioned him.'57
3. Cases Involving Abuse-Not-Amounting-to-Duress
The abuse cases that fall short of duress do not fall far. Each case
below holds that the abuse suffered did not to amount to duress. Again,
most cases include a history of abuse, often including abuse for
questioning or not obeying, and the wife signing the return fearing
further abuse if she refused.
In Brown (Kenneth) v. Commissioner, relief was granted to a wife
who suffered repeated physical abuse by her husband., 8 The husband
often forced his wife to sign tax returns and other important documents
without allowing her to read over them first. The court found that the
wife "always complied with his demands, for fear that she would be
beaten if she refused" and that she therefore did not know or have
reason to know of the underreported income on the tax return.' 9
In Kistner v. Commissioner, the husband refused his wife access to
their financial data and threatened to hurt her if she asked about the tax
returns.'6° The court did not find duress, but did find a history of physical
abuse that overrode any claim that she knew or should have known
about the erroneous items on the tax return.
6
In Makalintal v. Commissioner, the wife repeatedly suffered physical
abuse by the husband, who had also threatened her life at gunpoint on
numerous occasions. 6' The husband refused to talk about financial
matters with his wife and forbade her from driving a car, leaving their
home, and sometimes even confined her to their bedroom. 6, Thus, the
court said the wife had no duty to inquire further about the funds her
husband claimed were tax-free and from his prior business conducted
outside the country.6
4
A history of violent abuse, including concussions, cracked ribs, and
bruised lungs played an important part in negating the reason to know
requirement in Aude v. Commissioner.6' Due to the past abuse, the wife
had every reason to believe that she would be physically attacked if she
did not sign the returns, even though there was no verbal threat at the
156. Id. at 822.
157. Id. at 826.
158. 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1508 (1988).
159. Id. at 31-32.
16o. I8 F.3d 1521, 1526 (1Ith Cir. 1994).
16i. Id. at 1526-27.
162. 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1701, 1704 (1996).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1708.
165. 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 993, 1000 (1997).
[Vol. 58: 1123
May 2007] DURESS: A PERPLEXING BARRIER TO RELIEF
time she signed them.'66
As the above cases demonstrate, there is no meaningful difference
between spouses who sign joint returns under duress and those who sign
joint returns under abuse-not-amounting to duress. If like cases should
be treated alike, spouses suffering from duress should be granted the
same protection from joint and several liability as spouses suffering from
abuse-not-amounting-to-duress. The distinction drawn by the Treasury
Regulations is simply irrational. Moreover, it is at odds with legislative
intent.
B. INCONSISTENCY WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
When interpreting a statute one must first "'presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there. '"" The statutory language providing the actual knowledge
prohibition on separate liability relief under § 6oI5(c) includes an explicit
exception for duress cases: "This subparagraph shall not apply where the
individual with actual knowledge establishes that such individual signed
the return under duress." '68 However, if there is a need for clarification,
the legislative history provides ample guidance. The Congressional
Record supplies the following commentary by Senator Daniel Robert
Graham of Florida:
[W]e had testimony that some spouses signed the joint return, and may
even have had actual knowledge of its contents, but did so under
duress, including under physical duress. So we have provided a second
provision which says that even if you had actual knowledge at the time
you signed the return, that you would not be denied the right to apply
for this proportioning of responsibility if you, the individual, can
establish that the return was signed under duress.
[T]his is a very significant part of the provision of taxpayer relief which
is in this legislation. And it is a fairly expensive provision in terms of
the potential for lost revenue. But that expense is one that we believe
is a just expense because it will lift from the responsibility of taxpayers
who were ignorant of circumstances but were entrapped by conditions
that were often beyond their control and certainly beyond their
I66. Id.
167. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 195 (2000) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992)).
I68. I.R.C. § 6o15(c)(3)(C) (2ooo). The language of this subsection regarding the election of
separate liability provides in full:
Election not valid with respect to certain deficiencies. If the Secretary demonstrates that an
individual making an election under this subsection had actual knowledge, at the time such
individual signed the return, of any item giving rise to a deficiency (or portion thereof)
which is not allocable to such individual under subsection (d), such election shall not apply
to such deficiency (or portion). This subparagraph shall not apply where the individual with
actual knowledge establishes that such individual signed the return under duress.
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knowledge and in some cases the result of actual duress and coercion,
that we should recognize that and not require them to be responsible
for more than their proportional share of the deficiency.'
69
This legislative intent was brought to the attention of the IRS after it
issued proposed regulations for § 6OI5."70 The IRS responded by stating
that
to allow the benefits of a joint return in the absence of a valid joint
return election... would require that the IRS treat joint return
elections as valid for purposes of section 6oi5(c), but invalid for
purposes of section 6oi5(b) and (f), when the requesting spouse
establishes that the return was signed under duress.'7
This is not so. At the same time the IRS published the regulations
for § 6oi5, it chose to amend regulation section r.6o3-4(d) to provide
that a return signed under duress would not constitute a joint return.172
The IRS could have chosen to adopt regulations that would be more
tailored to legislative intent without creating inconsistent treatment
between the subsections of § 6oi5 by providing that all § 6oi5 relief is
available in situations where a joint return is signed under duress.7 3
Moreover, the IRS itself has created a paradox in which a taxpayer
suffering abuse-not-amounting-to-duress has more avenues for relief
available to him or her than one who suffered abuse in signing the return
(which, as noted above, is almost always accompanied by a history of
domestic violence). The IRS's current regulations'74 provide an exception
to the actual knowledge prohibition under § 6oi5(c) in cases that involve
abuse-not-amounting-to-duress and, under equitable relief § 6o15(f) and
§ 66(c), the IRS has also provided that abuse-not-amounting-to-duress
will usually override a knowledge (or reason to know) finding.75 So why
is the IRS concerned with an inconsistency between the subsections
within § 6o15 that it could easily resolve when it has created a more
egregious disparity in tax treatment that deviates from the clear
legislative intent?
C. WHY THE SEPARATE RETURN SOLUTION FOR DURESS IS INADEQUATE
The above question becomes even more relevant when viewed in
light of potential outcomes resulting from the current regulations. For
169. 144 CONG. REC. S4473 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Graham).
170. Letter from Karen Hawkins, Taggart & Hawkins, and Farley P. Katz, Strasburger & Price,
L.L.P., to Internal Revenue Service (May 25, 200i), in 2001 Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts) 124-36
(June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Comment Letter].
171. Relief From Joint and Several Liability, 67 Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,279 (July i8, 2002) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. i).
172. Hawkins, supra note 49, at 3.
173. Comment Letter, supra note 170, at 2.
174. Treas. Reg. § i.6oi5-3(c)(2)(v) (2002).
175. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296, §§ 4 .o1(7)(d), 4.03(2)(a).
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instance, take the following hypothetical situations.
Situation i. Wife, A, has endured a marriage riddled with domestic
abuse. She works as a supermarket cashier and makes $X/year. Her
abusive husband, B, makes $XXXfyear from running the computer
repair company he owns. Last year, A asked B how the family was able
to afford the lavish cruise they took and B told her never to ask him
about money matters and beat her so severely she suffered a concussion.
A did not benefit from the cruise because B locked her in the cabin for
the majority of the trip. When it came time to sign the joint tax return, A
knew that the income reported was inaccurate, but signed it anyway out
of fear that her husband would harm her. A and B are now divorced. The
IRS discovers that the cruise was improperly paid for by B's company
and begins deficiency proceedings against A because B has left the
country.
In this situation, A suffered abuse-not-amounting-to-duress in
general and did not suffer duress in signing the return. 1, 6 A therefore
makes the separate liability election under § 6015(c). Even though she
had actual knowledge that the income stated on the return was
underreported, the regulations permit her to circumvent this prohibition
by establishing the abuse (short of duress) that she suffered and that she
signed the return out of fear of her husband's retaliation. She will only
have to pay taxes on the amount that is attributable to her income as if
she filed a separate return. If the separate return status would cause her
to lose a credit or deduction, the credit or deduction is still allowed. If
she resides in a community property state, community property laws are
ignored and she will not be required to report half of her husband's
income on her "separate return." If the IRS denies her claim, the Tax
Court has jurisdiction to review the denial.
Situation 2. Wife, C, has endured a marriage riddled with domestic
abuse. She works at a retail store and makes $X/year. Her abusive
husband, D, makes $XXX/year from running the manufacturing
company he owns. Last year, D beat C so severely she suffered a
concussion. Afterwards, D took the family on a lavish cruise to "make up
for things." When it came time to sign the joint tax return, C asked how
D could have afforded a cruise with the income reported on the return.
D grew angry and told C she had better sign the return. When he raised
his arm to strike C, she signed the return. C and D are now divorced. The
IRS discovers that the cruise was improperly paid for by D's company
and begins deficiency proceedings against C because D has left the
country.
In this situation, C signed the return while under physical duress.
176. This is because she was not being threatened at the time she signed the return.
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The regulations under § 6oi5 provide that § 6Ol5 relief is not available to
her. Per the regulations under § 6oi3, the fact that she signed the return
under duress means that her tax liability will be determined as if she had
filed a married-filing-separately return. If she resides in a common law
state, she may lose all or a portion of certain credits and deductions that
would be available to her on a joint return. " If she resides in a
community property state, separate return status would make her liable
for the tax on half of her husband's income, and potentially half of the
deficiency attributable to her husband's improper financing of the cruise.
Therefore, C seeks relief under § 66(c), but is denied because the IRS
finds that she significantly benefited from the understatement as a
passenger on the cruise. The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a denial
of § 66 relief, so she must pay half of her husband's tax liability. 78
Alternatively, C could have chosen not to pursue the claim of duress, and
sought relief under § 6oi5(c) by raising abuse-not-amounting-to-duress
as a defense to the knowledge requirement. However, the IRS could
conceivably argue that C was in fact under duress in signing the return,
and C may end up where she started.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
To correct the inequity described above, the IRS should make the
following amendments to its regulations:
(I) Treasury Regulation 1.6oi3-4(d) should read: If an
individual asserts and establishes that he or she signed a
return under duress, the individual may choose either (I)
to nullify the joint return by re-filing with a married-filing-
separately tax return or (2) to pursue relief from joint and
several liability under § 6015(c).
(2) Treasury Regulation 1.6oi5-1(b) should read: If an
individual asserts and establishes that he or she signed a
return under duress, the individual satisfies the joint return
requirement and is relieved of knowledge or reason to
know prohibitions for the purposes of pursuing a claim for
§ 6oI5 relief.
Alternatively, Treasury Regulations 1.6oi3-4(d) and i.6oI5-I(b)
should be withdrawn. Either way, the result is to remove the barrier to
§ 6oI5 relief for spouses who have actual knowledge of a joint return's
inaccuracy but signed the return under duress. This result not only fulfills
177. The rate schedules in § i are essentially even right now; however, they have historically been
higher for married-filing-separately than for married-filing-jointly. See MALMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at
590.
178. After she pays the tax, she does have the option to sue for a refund in a federal district court,
but this is a very expensive way to get relief.
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the wishes of the legislature and the mandate of the statute,'79 but also
ensures a more evenhanded application of relief from joint and several
liability. For example, with the above modifications (or withdrawal of the
erroneous regulations), wife C, in Situation 2 above, now has access to all
of the benefits of § 6015(c), just like wife A, in Situation I. This is logical
because the two situations are similar in all relevant aspects: both wives
signed a joint return that they knew was inaccurate to avoid being subject
to violence, and both have since divorced their husbands.
CONCLUSION
Section 6oi5 relief from joint and several liability for tax deficiencies
arising from a joint return should be available to spouses who sign joint
returns under duress. Moreover, where, as here, the legislature has set
forth a specific avenue for relief, it is inappropriate for the IRS to make
that form of relief available to only a portion of the intended
beneficiaries and provide an inferior form of relief for the remaining
intended beneficiaries. But this is exactly what the IRS has done. As a
result, spouses suffering from abuse-not-amounting-to-duress may seek
relief under § 6oi5 while those who suffer actual duress in the signing of
joint returns are limited to a lesser form of relief, which in community
property states carries the potential to be no relief at all. The regulations
should be amended or abolished to correct this disparity.
179. Section 6o15(c)(3)(C) states:
If... an individual making [a separate liability election] had actual knowledge, at the time
such individual signed the return, of any item giving rise to a deficiency (or portion
thereof).., such election shall not apply to such deficiency (or portion). This subparagraph
shall not apply where the individual with actual knowledge establishes that such individual
signed the return under duress.
I.R.C. § 6oi5(c)(3)(C) (2ooo) (emphasis added).
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